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Abstract 
The EU’s is a curiously atypical legal system which construes the on-going shift from citizenship to 
personhood in global constitutional law in quite an atypical way. The advent of the person boasts, 
globally, a powerful ability to remedy the harsh edges of the arbitrary exclusionary legal fiction of 
citizenship by embracing those who do not qualify to benefit from it. In the EU, however, the turn of 
constitutionalism to personhood plays quite the opposite role: it disables the protections of EU 
citizenship. This curious turn, which this paper aims to document and discuss, has two consequences. 
Firstly, it annihilates citizenship as a meaningful legal status in the EU, since its declared benefits and 
protections can always be overridden by personal circumstances of the holder: precisely what 
citizenship, at its inception, was supposed to make impossible. Secondly, it deprives of protections of 
citizenship precisely those who need it the most, since they become invisible in the eyes of the powers 
that be. As a result citizenship in Europe is turning into a ‘citizenship of personal circumstances’ – a 
figure of inescapable individualism imposed on those in need, who are thereby detached from other 
citizenry and branded out as not good enough in the eyes of the Union – leaving little space to the grand 
ideals of the past. 
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 1 
Introduction 
Approached from the citizenship point of view, the EU’s is a curiously atypical legal system which 
construes the on-going shift from citizenship to personhood in global constitutional law1 in such a way 
that the advent of the person, while boasting, globally, a powerful ability to remedy the harsh edges of 
the arbitrary exclusionary legal fiction of citizenship by embracing those who do not qualify to benefit 
from it, plays quite the opposite role: it disables the protections of EU citizenship. In other words: while, 
globally, what can be loosely termed ‘personhood’ comes to the rescue when citizenship cannot help, 
thus creating de facto citizens where the de jure legal status is not extended, in the hands of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (ECJ), quite spectacularly, personhood serves as a tool of rationalizing 
the de facto exclusion from the rights and protections of EU citizenship. This curious turn, which this 
paper aims to document and discuss, has two consequences. Firstly, it annihilates citizenship as a 
meaningful legal status in the European Union,2 since its declared benefits and protections can always 
be overridden by personal circumstances of the holder: precisely what citizenship, at its inception, was 
supposed to make impossible.3 Secondly, it deprives of protections of citizenship precisely those who 
need it the most, since they become invisible in the eyes of the powers that be.4 As a result citizenship 
in Europe is becoming a ‘citizenship of personal circumstances’ – a figure of inescapable individualism 
imposed on those in need,5 who are thereby detached from other citizenry and branded out as not good 
enough in the eyes of the Union – leaving little space to the grand ideals of the past. 
The global thinning of citizenship explained 
‘Citizenship’ for the purposes of this contribution is defined in traditional legal-political terms, 
following the classical expression of Rogers Brubaker as ‘an object and an instrument of closure’.6 
Citizenship is thus the chalk of the line between the ‘outs’ and the ‘ins’; an indispensable element of the 
legal ‘world-making’:7 having asked for one’s citizenship, we are usually clear about whether that 
person counts in full in the eyes of our law. Not being in possession of the local citizenship, whether 
                                                     
 Chair in EU Constitutional Law, University of Groningen; Visiting Fellow Europainstitut Bern (Spring 2017). I am grateful 
to Robert Schütze, Christoph Schönberger and Daniel Thym, and also to Gráinne de Búrca, Daniela Caruso and other 
participants of the EU Law Professors Seminar at Boston College Law School in November 2016. The assistance of Vlad 
Belev, Ryan Chavez, Anna Gnap and Jacquelyn Veraldi is kindly acknowledged. Special thanks to Petr Agha, who hosted 
me in Prague: this paper was written during my tenure as Franz Weyr Fellow at Centre for Law and Public Affairs 
(CeLAPA), Institute of State and Law of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic (Fall 2016). 
1 Linda Bosniak, ‘Persons and Citizens in Constitutional Thought’ (2010) 8 Intl J Const L 9. cf. Dora Kostakopoulou, The 
Future Governance of Citizenship CUP 2008). For analyses of the European perspective see Loïc Azoulai, ‘L’autonomie 
de l’individu européen et la question du statut’ (2013) EUI Working Paper LAW 2013/14 < 
http://hdl.handle.net/1814/29098>; Loïc Azoulai, Etienne Pataut and Ségolène Barbou des Places (eds), Ideas of the Person 
and Personhood in European Union Law (Hart Publishing 2016). 
2 Let alone the ‘fundamental status’ the ECJ has proclaimed it to be: Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk v centre public dáide sociale 
d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve EU:C:2001 :458, [2001] ECR I-06193, para 31. See also, e.g. Case C-413/99 Baumbast and 
R v Secretary of State for the Home Department EU:C:2002:493, [2002] ECR I-07091; Case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz 
Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi (ONEm) EU:C:2011:124, [2011] ECR I-01177, para 41. 
3 Pedro Caro de Sousa, ‘Quest for the Holy Grail’ (2014) 20 ELJ 499; Dimitry Kochenov, ‘Neo-Mediaeval Permutations of 
Personhood in Europe’, in Loïc Azoulai et al. (eds), Ideas of the Person and Personhood in European Union Law (Hart 
Publishing 2016). 
4 Charlotte O’Brien, ‘Civis Capitalist Sum: Class as the New Guiding Principle of EU Free Movement Rights’ (2016) 53 
CMLRev 937; Dimitry Kochenov, ‘On Tiles and Pillars: EU Citizenship as a Federal Denominator’ in Kochenov (ed), EU 
Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights (CUP 2017) 1. 
5 See also Alexander Somek, ‘Europe: Political, Not Cosmopolitan’ (2014) 20 ELJ 142. 
6 W Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (HUP 1992) 34. 
7 Pierre Bourdieu, ‘The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field’ (1987) 38 Hastings Law Journal 814, 838. 
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admitted willingly or not, has always been tinted with a slight touch of presumed barbarity.8 By 
definition, the world outside of the Union borders is worse than our world: in the EU, the prospect of 
being expulsed into that wild wider reality outside our borders came to be protected by law better than 
living at home undisturbed:9 the apotheosis of parochial thinking lying nevertheless at the essence of 
citizenship as a legal status. It is thus unavoidable and fundamental, that citizenship, above all, is a legal 
status: Pierre Bourdieu is right that the law is very effective in pre-empting the recognition of what lies 
outwith the realm of the reality it has mandated and created,10 branding as non-existent any fact of social 
reality not overlapping with the legal truth,11 however harsh is the world shaped by the latter.12 The 
necessarily arbitrary nature of how the line between the citizens and the non-citizens is drawn in any 
society has not escaped the attention of commentators.13 Indeed, next to the production and reproduction 
of exclusion, the in-built arbitrariness arose as the second key feature of the status of citizenship.  
Citizenship, as a legal status of attachment to public authority,14 is always distributed uniquely by the 
authority itself. It does not depend on any sentiments and feeling of the citizenry, of course: as a 
Dutchman having spent a lot of time in the US I can perceive of myself as an ideal American (and even 
be accepted by my American-born friends as such), but this fact – just as not caring about my Dutch 
subjecthood or the monarch that much15 – has no bearing on the legal status I hold. This status entails 
the enjoyment of a set of citizenship rights including, but not limited in the majority of jurisdictions, to 
the right to stay and work in the territory under the jurisdiction of the authority in question, including 
the right not to be deported;16 political rights; and the entitlement to non-discrimination among citizens, 
i.e. the holders of a formal legal status of citizenship under a particular authority. Non-discrimination is 
of special importance in this context: while it is frequently positioned as a right, it is also, 
unquestionably, implied in the status as such. Remove the formal requirement of equality before the law 
and characterizing the resulting legal arrangement as a citizenship one would be most difficult to say 
the least: citizenship being premised on, precisely, the creation of a legal abstraction out of the actual 
people with all the differences that being a person implies, will fail to emerge if any other differences 
between the citizens, beyond the formal legal status they hold, became an indispensable precondition 
informing their duties and entitlements.17 
That the legal fiction so necessary for any modern constitutional system to survive is essentially arbitrary 
in nature is exceedingly difficult to ignore in a world where the whole ethos of the law is about asking 
for good reasons behind this or that element of the legal reality proclaimed by the powers that be. Indeed, 
constant questioning of authority’s mantras is what reinforces modern democracy18 and, at the level of 
                                                     
8 James Tully, On Global Citizenship: James Tully in Dialogue (Bloomsbury Academic 2014). 
9 Case C-434/09 Shirley McCarthy v Secretary of State for the Home Department EU:C:2011:277, [2011] ECR I-03375; Sara 
Iglesias Sánchez, ‘A Citizenship Right to Stay? The Right Not to Move in a Union Based on Free Movement’ in Dimitry 
Kochenov (ed), EU Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights (CUP 2017).  
10 Bourdieu (n 6). 
11 Jack M Balkin, ‘The Proliferation of Legal Truth’ (2003) 26 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 9. 
12 Jack M Balkin, ‘Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith’ (1997) 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1703. 
13 Ayelet Shachar, Birthright Lottery (HUP 2009). 
14 The formal level of the authority does not matter, usually: Rainer Bauböck, ‘Global Justice, Freedom of Movement and 
Democratic Citizenship’ (2009) 51 Archives européennes de sociologie 1. 
15 Dimitry Kochenov, ‘Mevrouw de Jong Gaat Eten’ (2011) EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2011/06 
<http://hdl.handle.net/1814/15774>. 
16 Bridget Anderson, Matthew J Gibney and Emanuela Paoletti, ‘Citizenship, Deportation and the Boundaries of Belonging’ 
(2011) 15 Citizenship Studies 547. 
17 Christian Joppke, Citizenship and Immigration (Polity, 2010), 96–110, (and the literature cited therein). 
18 Mattias Kumm, ‘The Idea of Socratic Contestation and the Right to Justification’ (2010) 4 LEHR 142. 
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the law, makes the Rule of Law possible.19 After the advent of the ‘culture of justification’ coming to 
replace ‘the culture of authority’20 arbitrariness is not quite the answer even in the world of the likes of 
Trump and May. Defending arbitrariness by allusions to the necessary nature of the outcomes it produces 
in a democracy – i.e. a body politic – cannot convince since it simply substitutes one arbitrariness (the 
body of those with a citizenship status) with another (the body of those who are politically involved and 
should have a citizenships status to participate). 
Consequently, and most logically, too, as we look back, the key trend in the citizenship evolution over 
the last decades has been to underplay citizenship’s former glory by reaching beyond the arbitrariness 
of the legal fiction lying at its base. This process had two key facets, which were profoundly interrelated. 
It consisted, firstly, of the extension of the rights formerly reserved for citizens only also to those who 
would not have the formal legal status as well as ensuring that all those in possession of the formal legal 
status could in fact enjoy citizenship rights, even women, minorities and naturalized citizens. As a 
consequence, the border line between citizenship rights and human rights came to be rethought under 
pressure, inter alia, from the rise of human rights ideology21 and the evolution of the basic relationship 
between the authority and the population under its control, citizens and non-citizens included.22 
Secondly, we can witness a gradual extension of the status – either de jure or de facto – to the groups of 
those who were previously randomly excluded. Such extension happened both in the courts of law23 and 
via legislative developments. Most importantly, the revision of nationality laws to make these more 
inclusive and tolerant of multiple nationalities facilitated a move away from the previous paradigm of 
exclusive allegiances.24 
                                                     
19 Gianluigi Palombella, È possibile la legalità globale? (Il Mulino 2012); Gianluigi Palombella, ‘The Rule of Law and its 
Core’ in Gianluigi Palombella and Neil Walker (eds), Relocating the Rule of Law (Hart Publishing 2009). 
20 Moshe Cohen-Eliya and Iddo Porat, Proportionality and Constitutional Culture (CUP 2013). 
21 Günter Frankenberg, ‘Human Rights and the Belief in a Just World’ (2014) 12 Intl J Const L 35. 
22 Yasemin Soysal, Limits of Citizenship (University of Chicago Press 1994). It comes as no surprise that residence – especially 
long-term residence in the territory of a particular state – came to acquire a special significance in this context: Davies, 
Gareth, ‘“Any Place I Hang My Hat?” or: Residence is the New Nationality’ (2005) 11 ELJ 43, 55; Daniel Thym, 
‘Residence as de facto Citizenship? Protection of Long-term Residence under Article 8 ECHR’, in Ruth Rubio-Marin (ed.), 
Human Rights and Immigration (OUP, 2014). 
23 While the law used to be precisely so categorical, the rise of Art. 8 ECHR jurisprudence prohibiting, in numerous cases, 
deportations to the country of citizenship, has created something akin to a de facto nationality, altering the legal reality to 
a great degree. See, for one of the first notable examples, the Concurring Opinion of Judge Martens in Beldjoudi (Beldjoudi 
v France (1992) Series A no 191-B; Jeunesse v Netherlands App no 12738/10 (ECtHR 3 October 2014). This trend, 
although markedly counter-orthodox in citizenship matters, and deeply empowering at the individual level has been 
criticized in the literature (e.g. Daniel Thym, ‘Respect for Private and Family Life under Article 8 ECHR in Immigration 
Cases: A Human Right to Regularize Illegal Stay?’ (2008) 57 Intl & Comp. L.Q. 87. Cf. Thym (n 22)) and is not yet a 
mainstream position of the European Court of Justice: Stanislas Adam and Peter Van Elsuwege, ‘EU Citizenship and the 
European Federal Challenge through the Prism of Family Reunification’ in Dimitry Kochenov (ed), EU Citizenship and 
Federalism: The Role of Rights (CUP 2017).  
The trend definitely adds to the picture of the on-going contestation of the normative foundations of citizenship and is 
observable also in the practice of the UN Human Rights Committee  (UNHRC), which is in tune with the ECtHR practice: 
UNHRC, ‘Stewart v Canada’ 1996 Communication No 538/1993 (‘no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter 
his own country’ (quoting Art. 12(4) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), G.A. Res. 2200A 
(XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (March 23, 1976)). See also UNHRC, ‘General Comment 27, Freedom of Movement (Article 
12)’ 2 November 1999 U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9. According to the Committee, the scope of ‘his own country’ 
in the sense of Art. 12 ICCPR is broader than ‘his country of nationality’ (at para 20). 
24 Peter J Spiro, At Home in Two Countries: The Past and Future of Dual Citizenship (NYUP 2015); Peter J Spiro, ‘Dual 
Citizenship as Human Right’ (2010) 8 Intl J. Const. L. 111. Again, exceptions are obviously there, even in the European 
Union, but the global trend towards multiple nationality toleration around the world is as clear as day, as Professor Spiro 
has masterfully proven. For a critical analysis of exceptional cases in the EU, see Dimitry Kochenov, ‘Double Nationality 
in the EU: An Argument for Tolerance’ (2011) 17 ELJ 323. 
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The consequence of this quest against arbitrariness leaping into the territory of citizenship, which is, in 
itself, an arch-example of arbitrariness in action, is the unavoidable thinning of citizenship as a legal 
status associated with an entitlement to rights, as well as the radical decrease in citizenship duties.25 This 
is not surprising at all: striving to make less arbitrary and less exclusionary the legal fiction whose aim, 
precisely, is to justify arbitrary exclusion from territory, society and, not infrequently, dignity (through 
the denial of equality before the law), can only result in a legal fiction which is a less meaningful one. 
This is how we came to the advent of the ‘citizenship-lite’ in Christian Joppke’s thoughtful analysis.26 
The high point of this development is the turn in constitutional theory to the figure of the person as 
opposed to a citizen, a no small feat in constitutional law.27  Let us trace the key steps of this 
development. 
The gradual extension of the scope of those enjoying the rights of citizenship among the actual bearers 
of the status is a well-known story of women, the indigenous peoples and other minorities. The gradual 
extension of those enjoying the status of citizenship in full is, again, the story of the ‘coloureds’ ‘unfit 
for citizenship’, of migrants and of the colonial subjects. Once it became unacceptable not to extend the 
rights of citizenship to settled minority categories, not allowing them to pass on citizenship became 
obviously problematized, just as the right of other minorities to enjoy access to the status as such.28 
As the gap between the scope of nominal citizens and the scope of citizens with citizenship rights was 
drastically diminishing (women got the right to vote and pass on the citizenship status to their 
descendants, for instance29), coupled with the extension of the status of citizenship to the formerly 
excluded minority groups (think of the extension of the full Australian citizenship to the aboriginals, for 
instance30), the ideological distinction between citizens and non-citizens in a society expectedly came 
to be problematized and contested, bringing about the increasing extension of rights, coupled with a 
grant of a (theoretical) possibility to acquire citizenship status to any settled resident of any modern 
liberal democratic state: the majority of jurisdictions today do not know formerly commonplace 
disqualifications related to race and religion, for instance.  
In other words, while the proclamation of equal rights of citizenship at the inception of citizenship was 
precisely the ideological tool to facilitate de facto socio-economic exclusion of huge chunks of society 
and the legitimation of authority in charge of the preservation of the status quo as T.H. Marshall 
explained,31 and was thus not even remotely overlapping with the actual reality on the ground, where 
citizenship actually endowed with rights was the privilege of a radical minority in a society – usually 
white males able to pass the property census32 – the two key trends outlined above – the gradual 
extension of rights and the extension of the status – brought the actual reality on the ground closer to 
the initial rhetorical ideal, also empowering further contestations of exclusions within the ambit of 
citizenship – think about the sexual citizenship story, for instance,33 or the on-going animal citizenship 
debate.34 
                                                     
25 Dimitry Kochenov, ‘EU Citizenship without Duties’ (2014) 20 ELJ 482. 
26 Christian Joppke, ‘The Inevitable Lightening of Citizenship’ (2010) 51 European Journal of Sociology 37. 
27 Bosniak (n 1). 
28 Sherally Munshi, ‘Immigration, Imperialism, and the Legacies of Indian Exclusion’ (2016) 28 YJLH 51. 
29 Michael Goldhaber, A People’s History of the European Court of Human Rights (Rutgers University Press 2007) 15–26. 
30 David Mercer, ‘“Citizen Minus”?: Indigenous Australians and the Citizenship Question’ (2003) 7 Citizenship Studies 421. 
31 TH Marshall, ‘Citizenship and Social Class’ in TH Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class (Pluto Press 1992). 
32 Women, although formally holding a citizenship status, were excluded not only from political rights, but also from the 
possibility to keep their status after marrying a foreigner or a stateless person or passing it on their children. cf. for US law 
examples, Patrick Weil, The Sovereign Citizen (Penn Press, 2012).  
33 Ŭładzisłaŭ Bełavusaŭ, ‘EU Sexual Citizenship: Sex beyond the Internal Market’ in Dimitry Kochenov (ed), EU Citizenship 
and Federalism: The Role of Rights (CUP 2017) (and the literature cited therein). 
34 Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka, Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights (OUP 2011); William A Edmundson, ‘Do 
Animals Need Citizenship?’ (2015) 13 Intl J Const L 749. 
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This, in turn, led to the relative – and necessarily welcome, given its harshly arbitrary and exclusionary 
beginnings – trivialization of the status of citizenship as well as a more faithful correspondence between 
the actual society under the authority in question and citizenry under the same authority. Once the 
rigidity of the citizens–non-citizens divide in terms of the corresponding rights and entitlements is 
questioned, abuses of power using this divide as the chief legal tool are made difficult. History knows 
plentiful examples of such unfortunate deployment of the citizenship status. Think, for instance, of 
Nuremberg laws excluding Germany’s Jewry from the status to justify their formal exclusion from the 
key rights of citizenship.35 South-African apartheid ‘homelands’, designed to distribute fake 
citizenships of non-recognized all-black puppet states, like Bophuthatswana and Transkei36 to grant 
minorities ‘full rights abroad’37 are equally good examples. More recently, Latvian and Estonian policy 
of humiliation of Russian, Ukrainian and Jewish minorities, based precisely on the same strategy of the 
denial of citizenship to supply a justification of exclusion from key rights did not work equally well: 
under pressure from the international institutions the majority of formerly ‘citizenship’ rights came to 
be extended to the minorities as ‘human’ rights.38 Not yet the right to vote, the right to a name39 or the 
right to speak the mother tongue at work,40 but the trend is clear: ‘they are not citizens’ is not an 
automatically enforced valid pretext anymore to abuse settled resident populations – at least it does not 
come unquestioned.   
Crucially and inseparably from the story of the status and rights, the same evolution affected citizenship 
duties, too. Traditionally the main vehicle of transposition of the purely legal truths into the reality of 
day-to-day lives through coercion, mass schooling and conscription, duties of citizenship are undergoing 
an astonishingly speedy recess in the majority of the liberal democratic jurisdictions around the globe, 
as ‘forging a good citizen’, i.e. punishing those deviating from the legal truth enforced by teachers, the 
army and the police (and, crucially, the complacency of the well-meaning law-abiding masses41), is not 
any more a defensible task of the state. In the majority of the liberal democratic jurisdictions there is no 
conscription,42 no more citizenship-based taxation,43 and no more harassment of dual nationals,44 to give 
                                                     
35 Kristen Rundle, ‘The Impossibility of an Exterminatory Legality: Law and the Holocaust’ (2009) 59 UTLJ 65, 69–76.  
36 At some point Wikipedia had the irony of mentioning Nelson Mandela among the ‘notable citizens’ of this ‘state’, which is 
not, per se, legalistically incorrect. 
37 See, e.g. South African, Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act, 1970, which instituted the denaturalisation of the black majority 
during the apartheid. cf. John Dugard, ‘South Africa’s Independent Homelands: An Exercise in Denationalization’ (1980) 
10 Denv. J. Intl'l L. & Pol'y 11. 
38 Pritt Järve, ‘Sovetskoje nasledije i sovremennaja ètnopolitika stran Baltii’, in Vladim Poleshchuk and Valery Stepanov (eds) 
Ètnopolitika stran Baltii (Nauka 2013); Dimitry Kochenov and Aleksejs Dimitrovs, ‘EU Citizenship for Latvian Non-
Citizens: A Concrete Proposal’ (2016) 38 Hous. J. Intl L. 1. 
39 UNHRC, ‘Raihman v. Latvia’ 2010 Communication No 1621/2007; on the problematic stance of the European international 
courts vis-à-vis this right, see Adam Łazowski, Eglė Dagilytė and Panagiotis Stasinopoulos, ‘The Importance of Being 
Earnest: Spelling of Names, EU Citizenship and Fundamental Rights’ (2015) 11 CYELP 1. 
40 Dimitry Kochenov, Vladim Poleshchuk and Aleksejs Dimitrovs, ‘Do Professional Linguistic Requirements Discriminate? A 
Legal Analysis: Estonia and Latvia in the Spotlight’ (2011) 10 European Yearbook of Minority Issues 137. 
41 Patricia Szobar, ‘Telling Sexual Stories in the Nazi Courts of Law: Race Defilement in Germany, 1933 to 1945’ (2002) 11 
JHS 131, pointing out that the persecution of the ‘Arian-Jewish’ couples relied entirely on the information provided by the 
good willing citizens. Countless similar examples from a variety of jurisdictions could be provided. 
42 The countries still keeping conscription stick out as highly atypical and experience very specific threats, perceived or real. 
Think about Estonia, Greece, Israel and Ukraine.  
43 With a marked exception of the US filing income taxes all around the world is residence-, not citizenship-based. cf. J Richard 
Harvey, ‘Worldwide Taxation of United States Citizens Living Abroad– Impact of FATCA and Two Proposals’ (2014) 4 
George Mason JICL 319; Taylor Denson, ‘Goodbye, Uncle Sam? How the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act Is 
Causing a Drastic Increase in the Number of Americans Renouncing Their Citizenship’ (2015) 52 Hous. L. Rev. 967. 
44 Peter Spiro, At Home in Two Countries (NYU Press, 2016). Again, exceptions are obviously there, even in the European 
Union, but the global trend towards multiple nationality toleration around the world is as clear as day, as Professor Spiro 
has masterfully proven. For a critical analysis of exceptional cases in the EU, see Dimitry Kochenov, ‘Double Nationality 
in the EU: An Argument for Tolerance’ (2011) 17 ELJ 323. 
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just a few examples. As long as the duties and the civic virtues promoted by any state are necessarily 
designed to quash the recognition of minority (and sometimes even majority, like was the case with 
women all around the world and the blacks in South Africa) groups in society,45 any arguments for their 
goodness and necessity all but fail to tell the whole truth, stopping at the retelling of the ideological 
mantras of the unity of demos and political community, as polished as they are comfortable, and ignoring 
the functions of such duties in the actual societies on the ground.46 
Turning to the conceptualization of citizenship through the ‘acts of citizenship’ is most appropriate in 
this context: the majority of those behind the constitutional moments are precisely the ones failing to 
buy what the authority is preaching: those not accepting the power of the duties narrative, i.e. the 
‘activist’ citizens in Engin Isin’s terms47 – from Dr. Martin Luther King and President Vaclav Havel to 
Colonel von Stauffenberg the list of such figures can be extended ab infinitum. It is thus a most welcome 
development that citizenship is not centered on duties anymore, thus becoming less totalitarian, more 
inclusive and forward-looking.48 It is not, thus, – in theory at least – based on idealized masculinities, 
given that the main duty has always been to kill for the authority that happened to draft you.49 19th 
century scholars would find it most surprising and counter-intuitive that full citizenship, including a 
package of rights associated therewith is attainable without conscription and sacrifice, let alone extended 
to the legally ‘unfit’ who cannot be conscripted at all, like women or minorities, for instance.50 With the 
waning away of the need to rationalize discrimination and de facto inequalities within the de jure status 
of equals, which seems to be the key function, which the duties of citizenship have traditionally been 
endowed with, the modern state certainly lost some of the stakes in the grand citizenship narrative of 
egalité, liberté and fraternité for the very select few on the pre-set terms of goodness which have to be 
shared by all at the gun point. 
 
The advent of personhood as a de facto alternative to citizenship thinking 
The residue of pre-human rights thinking predating the tectonic shifts in the understanding and practice 
of citizenship is still around, however, and could explain, inter alia, the backlash the world seems to be 
experiencing in the field of the regulation of access to the status of citizenship: naturalizations are more 
and more dependent on the elaborate rites de passage in the form of ‘culture’ and ‘values’ tests, which 
settled foreigners are required to pass to acquire the formal status of citizenship.51 The assumption 
behind such tests is as problematic as it is commonplace: the culture from across the border is a barbarian 
non-equivalent of our own.52 Putting this assumption to practice is even more difficult, however, than 
embracing it rationally, as the core value of any liberal democracy today is tolerance. Tolerance is what 
                                                     
45 A similar argument has been made in the context of constitutionalism as such: James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: 
Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (CUP 1995). 
46 For an example of such idealizing, see, e.g. Richard Bellamy, ‘A Duty Free Europe? What’s Wrong with Kochenov’s Account 
of EU Citizenship Rights’ (2015) 21 ELJ 558 (and the literature cited therein).  
47 Engin Isin, ‘Citizenship in Flux: The Figure of the Activist Citizen’ (2009) 29 Subjectivity 367.   
48 For a more systematic treatment, see, Dimitry Kochenov, ‘EU Citizenship without Duties’ (2014) 20 ELJ 482. 
49 Jamie R Abrams, ‘Examining Entrenched Masculinities in the Republican Government Tradition’ (2011) 114 West Virginia 
Law Review 165; Claire Snyder, Citizen-Soldiers and Manly Warriors: Military Service and Gender in the Civic 
Republican Tradition (Rawman and Littlefield 1999). In the European context, see, Belavusau (n 33).   
50 Taney CJ has famously used the legal inability of the blacks in the US to assume the duties of citizenship (based on a statute 
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US 393, 420–421 (1857). 
51 Ricky van Oers, Eva Ersbøll and Dora Kostakopoulou (eds), A Re-definition of Belonging? (Koninklijke Brill 2010). 
52 However nasty, this assumption seems to be ‘natural’: Melvin J Lerner, ‘The Justice Motive: Some Hypotheses As to Its 
Origins and Forms’ (1977) 45 Journal of Personality 1, esp. at 29. For the whole picture, see, Melvin J Lerner and Susan 
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all the ‘specificity testing’ is necessarily bound to come down to.53 In this sense testing the specificity 
of the highly unique Danish culture and of an even more unique Swiss one amounts, in fact, to testing 
one and the same thing. What such tests supposedly are testing, then, is whether someone is ready to 
concede that she is a second-rate human being since she is used to having her croissant plain, as opposed 
to with cream in the morning and be punished by sitting a test about the croissant with cream losing her 
time to remedy her inherent barbarian lack of dignity before naturalization becomes a fact attested by 
proper documentation. Whether she eats it with cream or not after naturalization is no one’s concern in 
a tolerant society. Most problematically however, the ‘integration tests’ which keep on proliferating, 
fully reflect the core thinking behind citizenship anywhere in the world: the presumption of virtually 
irremediable difference between societies serving as a pretext to disqualify those with a different formal 
legal attachment from key legal entitlements and recognition. 
Exclusion being the core normative foundation of citizenship, it is not a surprise that the status of 
citizenship enjoyed a more and more wobbly pedestal of glory, as of late, in constitutional theory, rivaled 
by its more physical and biological double: the person.54 Once the legal figure of a citizen gives way to 
a legal recognition of a physical reality of an ordinary human, constitutionalism cannot any more be the 
same. And this is exactly the move we are increasingly witnessing, which is very strongly attuned, 
logically, to the several lines of developments outlined above. 
The core issue of importance here is very basic and has to do with the traditional approaches to the core 
aspects of legitimacy in a political community: the justification of violence and of the obligation to 
submit to violence of the public authority as a necessary element of being ‘free’ going back to Jean 
Bodin55 and rooted in the Christian soteriology of the day.56 If only citizens and no one else are counted 
as the constituents of the collective whence legitimacy emanates – call it demos, the nation, political 
community – then the picture of what the state and, necessarily, the law is about will be quite different, 
necessarily, compared with a situation when humans are counted, non-citizens included. Indeed, why 
not put humans, persons, at the basis of demos, the nation, political community? While legal and social 
truths are bound to overlap for the law to be effective57 – and knowing the bio-power of the contemporary 
state in shaping the life itself to the whims of fashion of the day58 – making citizens is still much easier 
and less problematic than acknowledging humans. 
Making a citizen is an ideology-inspired legal exercise, implying a choice among the available bodies 
who could be useful or not for the achievement of the goals of the authority at any given time, whatever 
these are. Those bodies which are less useful are simply excluded and do not exist in the eyes of the law. 
Exclusions can run along any lines: geography of origin, race, religion, education, language, time; you 
name it, and a legal-historical example will be found. The citizenship’s capacity to exclude is its core 
function, which means that, in the ‘golden days’ of citizenship – the mythical days of the concept’s 
unquestioned authority – the exclusion at the level of the legal status could only rarely be questioned: 
equality is among citizens, remember? As a consequence, working with citizens the authority enjoys an 
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almost universal carte blanche: you create ethnic electorates,59 you assign the status of those who are 
not white enough to your liking to the ‘ancestral homelands’ referred to above,60 you declare those you 
send away as ideologically61 or racially deficient as non-citizens.62 The long history of fragrant 
discriminations is rich and diverse. Under the citizenship paradigm the core question before looking at 
rights, entitlements, duties and equality claims is who is a citizen in this society? Those who are not 
citizens are entitled to nothing and this is legally and politically right, even if frequently also morally 
unjust. 
Not the same at all with the persons: recognizing the person as a figure of importance for the purposes 
of constitutional law, as a component part of the demos, however humble this relative innovation can 
seem, in fact revolutionizes the legal understanding of our society since it opens the status assignment 
decisions which cannot in the majority of cases be contested under the citizenship paradigm, up for 
criticism and legal contestation. Moreover, it also flips the sequence of the status-rights interactions. 
The core question here is why this person is not entitled to a particular right? A simple ‘she is not a 
citizen’ answer will no longer suffice under the personhood paradigm: a substantive analysis will clearly 
be required. It goes without saying that the distinction between the ‘status’ and ‘rights’ taken by lawyers 
for granted is profoundly artificial and is not on all occasions justifiable.  
Once humanity and personhood, not the formal legal status of citizenship, emerges as the key factor in 
the rights assignment play, the relevance of the formal status of citizenship as such is profoundly 
reinvented, if not outright diminished, as we have seen in the Article 8 jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights for instance.63 Those who are French in fact by the way how their lives are lived 
and how their social world is constructed, even if not recognized as de jure French, even bearing foreign 
citizenships, will stay in France protected by the ECHR.64 The recognition of rights attached to 
personhood can thus lead even to the protection of what used to be the sacred core of the citizenship 
rights, like the residence in the territory of a state, among the non-citizens. Under this logic a place in 
the nation is not ‘deserved’ by passing humiliating tests of the knowledge of the non-existent cultural 
uniqueness or a random act of birth in particular circumstances, but by being part of a society. The threat 
of the loss of rights, then, assessed in the context of a concrete life project, will be the key factor of 
importance for the courts to consider, not the legal status of citizenship. Moreover, the harsh 
consequences of the loss of rights can even prevent the state from denaturalizing a person,65 or depriving 
a non-citizen of the core citizenship rights acquired de facto through the engagement with the society 
she lives in.66 Such a blending of legal and social reality would be unheard of before the 21st century.67 
The two logics – citizenship and personhood – finding themselves in a stark opposition to each other. 
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The cleavage runs between either taking legal or, which is quite a different matter, social facts as a 
starting point, thus providing a choice between parallel realities and their respective truths. This is the 
legal recognition of social facts in the growing array of contexts that pushes personhood as such, not 
necessarily connected to the formal status of citizenship, to prominence, with the far-reaching 
implications for the relevance of the classical normative picture of citizenship which we know from 
political theory textbooks. 
The rise of the citizenship circumstances in the EU 
The European Union, while officially – and even theoretically68 – heralding a break with at least some 
of the classical functions of citizenship, has indeed achieved a most radical break with this tradition, but 
the question of whether it is to the better or to the worse remains open. The recognition of personhood 
as opposed to citizenship only, while it can no doubt be empowering, can also provide a vehicle for the 
dismantlement of important protections normally associated with the citizenship status, especially the 
equality before the law. In fact, EU law as designed and as practiced, i.e. far from the realm of 
exceptions, plays the role which runs counter the normative foundations traditionally regarded as 
underpinning the citizenship concept, but also, crucially for this paper, departs from the personhood 
approach in a remarkable way, by turning such a departure against the extension of rights. 
Such (no doubt well-meaning69) intrusion into the illusory, if not deceptive, as demonstrated above, 
garden of normative coherence is to the better, but also to the worse: besides opening up to Europeans 
new categories of rights outside the realm of their own states,70 it has also questioned the essential 
elements of national citizenship, including the preferential relationship between the citizen and the state 
and, crucially, both aspects of Rogers Brubaker’s now classical definition of citizenship. This paper 
began with citizenship as ‘an instrument and an object of closure’.71 The EU dismantled it by demanding 
inclusion of other EU citizens into the national community guided by the principle of non-discrimination 
on the basis of nationality, thus ‘abolishing’72 the legal relevance of Member State nationalities in a huge 
array of crucial areas of human activity where EU law applies. The EU has also removed, to a great 
degree, the Member States’ ability to regulate migration of EU citizens, with a very clear outcome for 
the relevance and function of the nationalities of the Member States to go beyond providing a bridge to 
the ius tractum status of EU citizenship,73 i.e. serving as the means to acquire the supranational status. 
Thirdly, and crucially, EU law deactivated what is usually perceived of as one of the last remaining 
purely citizenship – as opposed to human – rights: the right not to be deported.74 With no right to stay at 
home guaranteed under EU, which pushes you to move states to save your rights or your family,75 
                                                     
68 Kostakopoulou (n 1). 
69 On the positive potential, see, eg. Dora Kostakopoulou, ‘European Union Citizenship: Writing the Future’ (2007) 13 ELJ 
623; Francis G Jacobs, ‘Citizenship of the European Union—A Legal Analysis’ (2007) 13 ELJ 591; Ferdinand 
Wollenschläger, ‘A New Fundamental Freedom beyond Market Integration: Union Citizenship and its Dynamics for 
Shifting the Economic Paradigm of European Integration’ (2011) 17 ELJ 34. 
70 Dimitry Kochenov, ‘Ius Tractum of Many Faces: European Citizenship and the Difficult Relationship between Status and 
Rights’ (2009) 15 Colum. J. Eur. L. 169. 
71 Brubaker (n 5), 34. 
72 Davies (n 22). 
73 Kochenov (n. 70).  
74 B Anderson, M J Gibney and E Paoletti (n 16), ‘Citizenship, Deportation and the Boundaries of Belonging’ (2011) 15 
Citizenship Studies 547. 
75 Niamh. Nic Shuibhne, ‘(Some of) the Kids Are All Right’ (2012) 49 CMLRev. 349; Sara Iglesias Sánchez, ‘A Citizenship 
Right to Stay? A Right Not to Move in a Union Based on Free Movement’, in Dimitry Kochenov (ed), EU Citizenhip and 
Federalism: The Role of Rights (Cambridge University Press, 2017) 371. 
Dimitry Kochenov 
10 Department of Law Working Papers 
combined with the European Arrest Warrant taking precedence, if need be,76 over national constitutional 
protections, EU citizenship, quite astonishingly, it may seem, does not carry with it a notion of a home77 
and possibly even forecloses – extreme circumstances aside – the national-level legal attempts to come 
to safeguard such a notion.78 As a consequence, on the one hand, the standard normative correlation 
between national citizens and the societies in the Member States came under strong pressure: the ability 
of the French state to distribute the token of Frenchness, the French passport, in this context cannot 
possibly hide the fact that France does not control who is de facto French for pretty much all the 
purposes,79 with the implications for the essence of the demos and the legitimation/justification of 
political power at both national and European level (especially given the exclusion of the European not-
quite-foreigners from the national-level franchise80). On the other hand, the ability of anyone to stay 
within the realm of his or her national legal system protected by it from expulsion to a foreign land is 
equally shattered. EU law, attentive as ever to personal CVs, perceived ‘links to the host state society’81 
and travel itineraries thus does not only reward the movers regarded as useful in the context of the 
internal market, but also ‘un-protects’ the static citizens even at the national level. Ironically, this 
happens precisely at the time when the importance of de facto citizenship’s recognition is growing 
exponentially, acquiring a radically new positive significance in the world of personhood 
constitutionalism, as seen above. 
I am not saying that deciding to crack states open in this way is a bad thing. For once, it has exposed 
plenty of untenable assumptions usually taken for granted which underlie and solidify the essence of the 
notion of citizenship and, by extension, the national community from the exclusivity and fragility of the 
national culture to the meaningfulness of the allegations that social security systems are conditioned on 
demos uniformity82 and, most importantly, the correlation between the functioning of democracy and 
citizenship as opposed to personhood sensu stricto. Are such assumptions worth fighting for? Certainly, 
EU law’s cracking open of states is overwhelmingly empowering for those people who are willing and 
ready to benefit from what is on offer – from a Lithuanian serving coffee in Wales to an Irish farmer 
acquiring land in Romania, or a Scottish physicist working on the CERN’s accelerator complex. 
Enforcing old assumptions would unquestionably imply trimming the life chances of such people.83 
What I am saying is that both aspects of the most accepted definition of citizenship in the literature today 
fail to find reflection in what the nationalities of the Member States have become after the advent of EU 
citizenship, which could probably provide one of the explanations for the gradual undermining of the 
latter which we are facing coming both from the level of the national law, especially in the UK, and this 
is long before Brexit,84 and also at the supranational level, where the ECJ seems to be minded to water 
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down the core of the supranational legal status,85 turning it, step by step, into a structural irrelevance in 
the context of the European law edifice. In Niamh Níc Shuibhne’s analysis86 which does not leave the 
realm of EU law, such backlash was only to be expected and is in fact nothing but a faithful adherence 
to the federalist principles.87 While this conclusion can be convincingly criticised, as Eleanor Spaventa 
has shown,88 it is beyond any doubt that the backlash can be explained in a sound way by looking at the 
overwhelming impact of EU law on what citizenship of the Member States is now about. 
The main problem with citizenship in the EU at the moment, it seems, is not confined to pushing the 
Member States to rethink which communities of people they are in charge of and should perceive of 
themselves as serving. It goes even deeper, since the ‘replacement’ citizenship at the EU level – never 
mind the ‘shall not replace’89 language of the Treaty, which can only make legalistic, ‘who issues the 
passport?’ kind of sense, failing to capture the essence of the deeper on-going processes discussed in the 
preceding parts.  While EU citizenship has the potential to ‘take over’, de facto, from the nationalities 
of the Member States, it seems to be based on entirely different principles, compared with any other 
citizenship in contemporary world. It is a citizenship conditioned on a market endorsement and the 
performance of ethically questionable acts, like venturing out across the invisible inter-state borders 
within the internal market.90 Is this the idea of a good life worth living shared by the absolute majority 
of Europeans? 
Rather than a celebration of the abstract humanity of the bearer through the extension of rights based on 
a formal legal status aimed at ignoring the actual differences between the holders, EU citizenship, on 
the contrary, virtually never protects the weak and the needy based on their humanity and legal status,91 
but uniquely connects such protection with the perceived cross-border or economic aspects of the lives 
in question. In this sense, this is a citizenship where a turn to personhood results in the limitation rather 
that the extension of the amount of rights associated with the status. Importantly, one cannot 
wholeheartedly claim that this only happens at one level of governance, leaving the level of the Member 
States sensu stricto unaffected. This ‘citizenship of personal circumstances’ has in fact legally dislodged 
in many respects ideologically sound national-level statuses, which are, precisely, not dependent on the 
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performance of ideologised ethically and morally contingent acts, like contributing to the internal market 
in any way whatsoever. 
The supranational-level citizenship undermining the national ones cannot, thus, withstand even the most 
basic criticism based on human dignity and human worth: these cannot depend on a used bus ticket: 
either you move in space or not is necessarily irrelevant from a moral or ethical perspective. Most 
reasonable suggestions voiced in the literature to disconnect the logics of citizenship from the market-
inspired reading of the jurisdictional boundaries between the legal orders in Europe by either making 
the internal market logic irrelevant for the enjoyment of citizenship rights,92 or, by giving the right not 
to move full recognition among the entitlements of EU citizenship deserving legal protection,93 remained 
unanswered calls in a highly ideological context of European integration where the foundational ideal 
of the good, however ethically vacant non-obvious – i.e. the binding requirement to move about, is 
predetermined and seemingly immune from contestation.94 It is a citizenship without respect designed 
to bring down those whom the internal market does not need and thus perceives of as disposable and 
unworthy of protection, recognition and respect.95 EU citizenship, in failing to endow with protections 
all those who possess the formal legal status, looking instead at the particular acts they engage in, 
instead, is the anti-thesis of what citizenship is about.96 The worth of the legal truth of status assignment 
here frequently remains almost entirely inconsequential. 
This being said, this is all about giving recognition to the person, of course, as opposed to the classical 
reality the departure from which was discussed in the preceding parts. The interesting thing with EU 
citizenship, however, is that the departure from the classical legalistic understanding of citizenship is 
actually used to the effect of depriving persons of rights under this pretext, rather than empowering 
them, which is the general constitutional trend outside the EU’s constitutional context, as described 
above. Instead of using the logic of the shift from the purely legal to social reality to extend additional 
protections to those whom the legalistic framework renders invisible, EU citizenship deploys the same 
to the opposing end: to preempt the extension of rights. In this sense EU citizenship is a negative 
departure from the abstract citizenship ideal, looking beyond the strictly legal truth of the supranational-
level status only to undermine the latter’s effects should the dogmatic ideal of a ‘good market citizen’,97 
which is by definition deprived of any moral or ethical contenu whatsoever, not be satisfied.98 This 
unexpected development demonstrates the attractiveness of the formal legalistic world of clearly 
formulated and meticulously enforced legal truths which citizenship has precisely been drifting away 
from over the last decennia, turning modern constitutionalism towards the person. How did the EU land 
with such an atypically modern and at the same time astonishingly mediaeval citizenship on its hands,99 
which is both in line with and, simultaneously, in contradiction with the global trends? 
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Undermining rights through attention to CVs 
As the integration project matured, Europe’s main strength became its chief weakness. Conceived as a 
market to serve the ideals grander than simple economic prosperity, thus intended to benefit each and 
every European through becoming part of our ‘legal heritage’, as the Court has amply noted in van 
Gend,100 European law failed to move on with the times. Conceived once upon a time as a stepping stone 
to peace, and a bunch of other valuable ideals, now reflected in Article 2 TEU (but also colonialism101 
and building a unified European nuclear force102) the Union gradually lowered its ambition: the means 
for greater progress, which was the market, fell on itself to take the chief place among the Union’s 
ends.103 This subtle taming of ambition, while sellable to an inattentive observer as a sign of respect vis-
à-vis the Member States’ sovereignty is in fact something else, it seems. 
When the market is the means to achieve something greater, the limitations it imposes on the national 
authority are justifiable: as the official story goes, the Member States lost political and economic upper 
hand in the name of liberty – an insurance policy against totalitarian twists – and prosperity – a social 
Europe where tomorrow is better than today – which is to come through unity. Much has changed, 
however, since the first version of the story had been written. Prosperity is not on the horizon anymore, 
at least not for everyone,104 liberty is none of the Union’s business: the Union is not effective at all us 
against Polish-Hungarian-style ‘illiberal democracies’ as we are discovering,105 some commotion in 
high places notwithstanding.106 
Instead of the optimism of a new beginning championed by the élites of the past, Union law is now a 
binding and directly effective tool to tame us, European citizens, in the name of a highly specific version 
of the market it cherishes. In the name of the internal coherence of the market we are shielded from 
European human rights standards;107 in the name of its smooth operation the market is ‘apolitical.’108 
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The CFI makes this situation even worse, since as long as EU citizenship is not endowed with a formal legal capacity to 
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This is good for us, we are told, because the Treaties say so109 and because politics, as much as the 
Treaties allow for it, is by definition the politics of means, not the politics of ends: the direction of 
European Unity is set in stone and not negotiable politically within the framework of the institutions the 
Treaties have created.110  
Speaking of utopias, Sir Isaiah Berlin diagnosed that ‘in a society in which the same goals are universally 
accepted, problems can be only of means, all soluble by technological methods. That is a society in 
which the inner life of man, the moral and spiritual and aesthetic imagination, no longer speaks at all’.111 
Our supranational legal heritage lays claim to our imagination and fails, to which the rise of all kinds of 
extremist movements testifies. For the first time in its history the Union is routinely perceived as a 
potentially powerful agent of injustice not only by nationalists and outcast lunatics, but also by its own 
servants and facilitators, professors of EU law; Gráinne de Búrca is absolutely right pointing out that 
the EU can be perceived as ‘patent injustice.’112 Perceptions have changed, probably, because the market 
without a ‘mantle of ideals’ is not a pretty sight:113 the citizenship it is responsible for, having de facto 
overpowered the core elements of the nationalities of the Member States in a number of respects 
frequently punishes, instead of protecting. This is done with a most meticulous attention to detail: the 
‘good citizenship’, which the Union cherishes,114 rests on the intimate personal connection with the idea 
of the internal market and cross-border movement: virtually the only measure of someone’s worthiness 
in the eyes of the supranational law.  
The Union could try redeeming itself through making its law at least sensitive to human suffering: Sir 
Isaiah’s ‘first public obligation’. This can be done, at the very least, through allowing the van Gend 
‘legal heritage’ of the citizens to play a more significant role in the system than the market logic, the 
latter emerging as particularly problematic in the citizenship context as long as it shapes the formal 
status of citizenship which can be deactivated by the failure to engage with the market sufficiently, as 
explained above, forming the worst and the least humane blend of the legal truth and social reality 
paradigms of personhood in law. In a constitutional system – even where democracy as such is out of 
reach115 – rights cannot be acquired by engaging in ethically and morally irrelevant acts; mothers are 
not punished when disability of their children prevents them from work;116 and tax-breaks do not depend 
on the nationality of your former wife.117 The core problem with EU citizenship today is precisely that 
the principle behind the application of the law directly penetrating countless lives is rather farcical and 
thus inexplicable at all from a rational humane perspective. Moreover, violence is done in the name of 
the perceived Member States’ sensitivities, where in fact, this is the (often absurd) dull market-inspired 
sophistry that is at play: ‘when he grows up, he might want to move across the non-existent border’.118 
Approached from this perspective the Union merely boasts a questionable legal status, which is hardly 
worthy of the glorious ‘citizenship’ denomination: the Ruiz Zambrano detour119 was all too brief and we 
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seem to be back to square one, to Joseph Weiler’s poignant criticism of the classical status quo: the 
Union ‘precisamente omette di compiere la transizione concettuale da una libera circolazione basata 
sul mercato ad una libertà basata sulla cittadinanza’,120 piling upon ethically questionable idea of the 
good the dubious and disctiminating ‘citizenship of personal circumstances’. 
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